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COMMENTS
OIL AND GAS-CONSERVATION-PRORATION---In 1954 the New Mexico
Oil Conservation Commission prorated the Jalmat Gas Pool in Lea County,
New Mexico, using a "pure acreage" formula.' By the end of 1957, the pool
apparently was unable to produce its allowable.2 Texas Pacific Coal and Oil
Co., one of the producers in the field, petitioned the Commission to either
terminate proration or change the proration formula.8 The Commission held
hearings and issued orders 4 changing the formula to one which included a
"deliverability" factor." Seven producers8 in the pool appealed the orders
to the district court where they were affirmed. 7 On appeal to the Supreme
Court of New Mexico in Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n,s
held, Reversed with directions to declare the orders invalid and void.9
* Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809
(1962).
1. The "pure acreage" formula is:
at = a (A)
where at is the allowable production from tract "t," Ta is the acreage of
tract "t," Fa is the total acreage overlying the field, and A is the total allow-
able for the field.
2. Brief for Appellees, p. 12, Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70
N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
3. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 314, 373 P.2d 809,
811 (1962).
4. Order No. R-1092-C (N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n 1958) replaced, with one
slight exception, the original order, Order No. R-1092-A (N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm'n 1958).
S. The "deliverability" formula is:
Ta T a
at = .25 (a) + .75 (-a) (A) (d)
Fa Fa
where at is the allowable production from tract "t," Ta is the acreage of tract
"t," Fa is the total acreage overlying the field, A is the total allowable for
the field, and d is the "deliverability" factor.
The "deliverability" factor is proportional to the amount of gas the well would
produce if permitted to produce without restriction against a specified back pressure.
Sullivan, Oil and Gas Law 334 n.99 (1955). This is essentially the same formula that
was used in New Mexico's West Kutz-Prichard Cliffs Gas Pool. See Conservation of
Oil and Gas: A Legal History, 1958, at 161 n.43 (Sullivan ed. 1958).
6. Continental Oil Co., Shell Oil Co., Amerada Petroleum Corp., Pan American
Petroleum Corp.; Atlantic Ref. Co., Humble Oil & Ref. Co., and Standard Oil Co. of
Texas, See Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 313, 373
P.2d 809, 811 (1962).
7. Id. at 313, 373 P.2d at 811.
8. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
9. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 327, 373 P.2d
809, 820 (1962).
The supreme court's decision to invalidate the orders rather than remand the case
to the district court was based upon the conclusion that the Commission failed to
The major portion of the supreme court's opinion was devoted to the Com-
missions Finding of Fact No. 5.10 Finding of Fact No. 6, although in issue,
was not subjected to as complete an examination. Finding of Fact No. 6 was:
'That the inclusion of a deliverability factor in the proration for-
mula for the Jalmat Gas Pool will result in the production of a
greater percentage of the pool allowable, and that it will more nearly
enable various gas purchasers in the Jalmat Gas Pool to meet the
market demand from said pool."'
Appellees12 argued that Finding of Fact No. 6 related to the protection of
make basic jurisdictional findings of fact. Commission Finding of Fact No. 5 was:
'That the applicant has proved that there is a general correlation between
the deliverabilities of the gas wells in the Jalmat Gas Pool and the [recover-
able] gas in place under the tracts dedicated to said wells, and that the
inclusion of a deliverability factor in the proration formula for the Jalmat
Gas Pool would, therefore, result in a more equitable allocation of the gas
production in said pool than under the present gas proration formula.'
(The word "recoverable" in brackets above is the only change made by the
Commission by its aflirmatory Order No. R-1092-C.)
Id. at 317-18, 373 P.2d at 814.
To understand the problem involved, consider the hypothetical case where A and
B each own equal surface acreage overlying a gas pool. Suppose each is allowed to
produce from one well for twenty-four hours under the same operating conditions. If
A produces twice as much gas as B, one possible inference is that there is more re-
coverable gas under A's tract than under B's tract. This was the inference made by the
Commission in Finding of Fact No. 5. The finding was based upon expert testimony.
There was also expert testimony that deliverability did not correlate with recoverable
gas in place. It would seem from the supreme court's opinion that the Commission
could properly decide which expert testimony to believe. Id. at' 318, 373 P.2d at 814.
The supreme court's objection was not that the Commission's finding of fact was not
supported by substantial evidence. It was that there was no basic jurisdictional finding
of fact. The Continental court said that before the Commission could take jurisdiction,
the following basic facts must be found:
(1) the amount of recoverable gas under each producer's tract;
(2) the total amount of recoverable gas in the pool;
(3) the proportion that (1) bears to (2) ; and
(4) what portion of the arrived at proportion can be recovered without waste.
Compare the pure acreage formula, note I supra, with the deliverability formula,
note 5 supra. Both formulas give the proportion the supreme court indicated as basic
fact No. (3). But both give the proportion indirectly rather than using basic facts
Nos. (1) and (2). This is the usual procedure since any estimate of the total recover-
able gas in a pool or the recoverable gas under each producer's tract is almost always
an educated guess. See DeChazeau & Kahn, Integration and Competition in the
Petroleum Industry 176 n.16 (1959). So the pure acreage formula is subject to the
same failings as the deliverability formula. What the supreme court calls fact No. (3)
is really the only one which is necessary for the protection of correlative rights.
10. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 317-18, 373
P.2d 809, 814 (1962).
11. Id. at 318, 373 P.2d at 814.
12. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., El Paso Natural Gas Co., Permian Basin Pipe-
line Co., and Southern Union Gas Co. Id. at 310, 373 P.2d at 809.
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correlative rights among fields in the same proration district. 13 The Com-
mission argued that the finding related to waste.' 4 The supreme court con-
cluded that Finding of Fact No. 6 did not relate to the prevention of waste
or to the protection of correlative rights. 5 It is possible, however, that Finding
of Fact No. 6 provides a basis for upholding the Commission's orders apart
from any direct relationship to the prevention of waste or to the protection of
correlative rights. Before developing this possibility, it will be helpful to review
the fundamentals of proration in the oil and gas industry.
"Proration" is the process of (1) limiting production to some proportion of
the amount which could be produced in the absence of any restrictions, (2)
distributing the allowed production among fields in the same proration dis-
trict, and (3) distributing the allowed field production among the producing
wells within the pool. 16 Proration is necessary to prevent physical waste by
keeping the rate of production at or below the "MER" (maximum efficient
rate), or to prevent economic waste by prohibiting production in excess of
market demand.
MER is the "maximum efficient rate" or the "most efficient rate" at which
a well can produce without impairing the efficiency of the reservoir energy with
consequent physical underground waste.17 It is the upper limit on the rate of
production beyond which any increase will mean a decrease in the amount of
ultimate recovery. The MER has real significance when applied to oil pools or
to water-drive gas fields, since production at too rapid a rate in these cases could
result in the inefficient use of the reservoir drive.' 8 But the Jalmat Gas Pool is
a dry-gas field. For practical purposes, all of the reservoir energy is supplied
by the gas itself.19 There is no reason to limit the rate of production from a
dry-gas pool to prevent underground waste since the rate of production can
not injure the reservoir energy, i.e., the gas itself.20 For all practical purposes,
13. Appellees reasoned that under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-13(d) (1953), the Com-
mission has a duty to prevent unreasonable discrimination among pools. Where a pool
is unable to meet its allowable because of the proration formula used, the result is
that the pool as a whole is being discriminated against. Brief for Appellees, pp. 12-13.
14. The Commission made the general argument that all orders involve waste,
implicitly or explicitly. Brief for Cross-Appellant, p. 5.
15. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 320, 373 P.2d
809, 816 (1962).
16. Sullivan, Oil and Gas Law 311 (1955).
17. Id. at 315.
18. Id. at 27, 28.
19. Id. at 28.
20.
The Champlin Case [Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S.
210 (1932)], however, is distinguished . . . because . . . the matter dealt with
[in Champlin] was oil, and the court made it very clear that its finding was
based upon the fact that physical waste . . . was indicated * * * 0 In the
present case . . . there is an absolute lack of evidence to show physical waste.
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production from the Jalmat Gas Pool, since it is a dry-gas pool, should be
limited only to prevent production in excess of market demand.
Market demand is the demand for reasonable current requirements and for
maintaining reasonable storage reserves.2 ' Restricting production to market
demand is usually justified by arguing that such production leads to or causes
physical waste. Excess production results in lower prices and over-production.
Lower prices force marginal producers to abandon their wells, leaving large
amounts of oil and gas underground. Over-production results in the storage of
large amounts of oil and gas which are subject to evaporation and increased
danger of loss from fire or other hazards. 22 Statutes requiring production to
. . . There is no water problem in this gas field, no evidence of channeling,
coning, or entrapment, nor any other condition shown by the record which
might involve physical injury to the gas structure there.
Canadian River Gas Co. v. Terrell, 4 F.Supp. 222, 227 (W.D. Tex. 1933).
But see Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 55-703 (1949); Sullivan, Oil and Gas Law 333
(1955). Limitations on gas production to some percentage of the total open-flow of
the pool correspond in a general way with the MER restriction. Whether such limita-
tions can be defended as logically as the MER restriction is open to question. New
Mexico does not require gas production to be limited to a certain percentage of the
open-flow production.
21. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n, Rules and Regulations 8 (1961).
22. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932) ; see generally
Hardwick, Legal History of Conservation of Oil in Texas, Legal History of Conserva-
tion of Oil and Gas-A Symposium 222 (Published by Mineral Law Section, A.B.A.,
1938) ; Hardwick, Texas, Conservation of Oil and Gas; A Legal History, 1948, at 469
(Murphy ed. 1949).
However, opponents of market demand statutes claim that "economic waste" when
used to describe production in excess of market demand is an euphemism for price fix-
ing. One court bluntly said:
[U]nder the thinly veiled pretense of going about to prevent physical waste
the commission has, in co-operation with persons interested in raising and
maintaining prices of oil and its refined products, set on foot a plan which,
seated in a desire to bring supply within the compass of demand, derives its
impulse . . . in the attempt to control the delicate adjustment of market supply
and demand, in order to bring and keep oil prices up.
McMillan v. Railroad Comm'n, 51 F.2d 400, 404-05 (W.D. Tex. 1931).
There is little doubt, however, that production in excess of market demand can lead
to physical waste. This is particularly true in the case of gas, since above ground
storage of gas is difficult, if not impossible, without physical waste. But, it is also
true that market demand statutes have tended to stabilize prices. A recent economic
analysis of the oil and gas industry reported that:
[T]hough the Texas Commission has often denied any concern for price, it is
clear beyond cavil that its exercise of control over supplies has had a major
impact in snubbing crude-oil price declines.
DeChazeau & Kahn, Integration and Competition in the Petroleum Industry 163-64
(1959).
This is not to say that stabilization of prices is wrong or harmful. Whether price
stabilization through the use of market demand statutes is desirable is really a question
involving economic and political, not legal, considerations.
JANUARY, 1964] COMMENTS
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
be limited to market demand have been upheld in other jurisdictions. 28
The New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission is authorized to restrict
production to prevent waste.24 Waste is defined to include both the usual types
of physical waste25 and production in excess of market demand.26 In Conti-
nental there was no suggestion of physical waste. Therefore, there was no reason
to limit production except to prevent excess production.2 7
The total field allowable for the Jalmat Gas Pool was set in accordance with
market demand. But, because of the proration formula in use, i.e., pure acre-
age, 28 the field as a whole could not produce the allowable. In other words,
production was limited to an amount less than market demand. Using this
analysis it can be argued that the Commission had a duty to change the pro-
ration formula used in the Jalmat Gas Pool.
The Commission is only authorized to restrict production to prevent waste. 29
23. Burnett v. Corporation Comm'n, 157 Kan. 589, 142 P.2d 810 (1943) ; C. C.
Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 Pac. 841 (1930) ; Sterling
Ref. Co. v. Walker, 165 Okla. 45, 25 P.2d 312 (1933) ; Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142
Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941 (1944). But cf. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963), where the opinion can be interpreted to mean that the
United States Supreme Court may find proration based upon market demand to be
within federal rather than state jurisdiction. See generally Comment, 3 Natural Re-
sources J. 361 (1963).
24. N.M. Stat. Ann § 65-3-10 (1953).
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-3-3(a)-(b) (1953).
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-3 (e) (1953).
27. The supreme court may not have recognized the significance of the lack of any
element of physical waste apart from the physical waste associated with excess pro-
duction. The court said:
[Ilf the allowable production from the pool exceeds market demand, waste
would result if the allowable is produced. . . . Conversely, production must
be limited to the allowable even if market demand exceeds that amount,
since the setting of allowables was made necessary in order to prevent waste.
Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 320, 373 P.2d 809, 816
(3962).
The first sentence of this comment is true. But the second sentence is not true where
the allowable is an amount less than the amount fixed by the MER. The Jalmat Gas
Pool is prorated to prevent waste associated with production in excess of market
demand. Production at or below market demand does not lead to waste. Therefore,
if the field allowable is less than market demand, no waste is introduced by raising the
allowable to meet the demand.
28. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
29. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-3-12, -13(a), -13 (c) (1953).
It might be argued that the Commission does have power to restrict production
solely to protect correlative rights. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-10 (1953), says: "The Com-
mission is hereby empowered, and it is its duty, to prevent the waste prohibited by this
Act and to protect correlative rights, as in this act provided." [Emphasis added.] The
words "as in this act provided" are fatal to any argument that the Commission can
restrict production merely to protect correlative rights. The Act only provides for the
protection of correlative rights if production is restricted to prevent waste. In Con-
tinental, the Commission said: "Section 65-3-13(c), NMSA, 1953 Comp., clearly states
that gas proration can be instituted by the Commission only to prevent waste."
Brief for Cross-Appellant, p. 5.
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In Continental waste was not in issue.80 Waste would only become an issue
if production exceeded the market demand. Therefore, restricting production
to some amount less than the market demand is not authorized by the statutes.
The only valid restriction the Commission could impose would be one limiting
production to market demand. The statutory duty to protect correlative rights
only applies if the total field production is limited to prevent waste.
31
In the absence of waste other than the waste associated with production in
excess of market demand, the Commission can not limit production below
market demand since such a limitation would not prevent waste.32 In Conti-
nental, the Commission's Finding of Fact No. 63' clearly implies that pro-
duction from the Jalmat Gas Pool was in fact limited to an amount below
market demand. Therefore, the Commission had to either terminate proration
or change the old proration formula to one which would permit the field, as
a whole, to meet the field allowable.
THOMAS A. GARRITY
30. This assumes that waste does not include protection of correlative rights by
definition. See Comment, 3 Natural Resources J. 178 (1963). But see Continental Oil
Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 318, 373 P.2d 809, 814 (1962), where the
court said: "the prevention of waste . . . is an integral part of the definition of cor-
relative rights."
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-13(c) (1953) ; see note 29 supra.
The Commission, however, should be able to issue orders based solely upon cor-
relative rights if the total field allowable is set to prevent waste. See, e.g., Corzelius v.
Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945). In a recent comment, it was assumed
that the restriction on the Jalmat Gas Pool's total production did prevent waste, so that
the separation of powers constitutional issue could be analyzed. In that comment the
argument was that .it should not be unconstitutional for the Commission to issue orders
based solely upon correlative rights. See Comment, 3 Natural Resources J. 178 (1963).
But see Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 324, 373 P.2d 809,
818-19 (1962). The present comment does not suggest that the Legislature can not
constitutionally authorize the Commission to restrict production solely to protect cor-
relative rights, but that the Legislature has not given such authority to the Commission.
32. Sims v. Mechem, 382 P.2d 183, 185 (N.M. 1963) ; cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan
Oil Co., 152 Tex. 439, 259 S.W.2d 173 (1953). See generally Note, 32 Texas L. Rev.
350 (1954) ; Conservation of Oil and Gas: A Legal History, 1958, at 234- (Sullivan ed.
1958). In Rowan, the court said that the Railroad Commission did not have the
authority to limit production from wells where gas was not being wasted merely to
protect the correlative rights of the owners of wells which could not produce without
waste.
33. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 318, 373 P.2d
809, 814 (1962). See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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